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ROBERT G. SPECTOR*
I. International Conventions - Developments
A. THE HAGUE CHILD SUPPORT CONVENTION
The United States ratified the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of
Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the Hague Child Support Con-
vention) in 2010. Implementing legislation has passed the U.S. House of Representatives.
The Convention will come into force internationally on January 1, 2013, with the ratifica-
tions of the United States, Norway, and Albania.'
B. HAGUE CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAw, RECOGNITION,
ENFORCEMENT, AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PARENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN, CONCLUDED OCTOBER 19, 1996
(THE 1996 CONVENTION)
The United States has signed the 1996 Convention and is committed to ratification.
The process will be through a combined effort of federal and state legislation. The state
legislation will be amendments to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforce-
ment Act (UCCJEA). The Uniform Law Commission has appointed a drafting commit-
tee, and the proposed amendments had a first reading in 2012.2 A second and final
reading will take place in summer 2013.
* Robert G. Spector is the Glenn R. Watson Chair and Centennial Professor of Law Emeritus at the
University of Oklahoma Law Center. This article reviews selected developments in international family law
during the year 2012. For developments in 2011, see Robert G. Spector & Bradley C. Lechman-Su,
International Family Law, 46 Lwr'L LAw. 155 (2012). For developments in 2010, see Robert G. Spector &
Bradley C. Lechman-Su, International Family Law, 45 Iwr'L LAw. 147 (2011).
1. Status Table: 38: Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Otber
Forms ofFamily Maintenance, HAGUE CONT. PRIVATE INT'L L., http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=con-
ventions.stats&cid=131 (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
2. See Committees: Hague Convention on Protection of Children, UFORM L. CoMwussioN, http://www.uni-
formlaws.org/Committee.aspxtitle=Hague%20Convention%20on%20Protection%20of%20Children (last
visited Feb. 7, 2013).
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C. HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION (THE ABDUCTION CONVENTION)
The Hague Conference on Private International Law held a special session on the
working of the Convention in January 2012. The conclusions and recommendations of
the session can be found on the website of the Hague Conference.3
II. International Litigation
A. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION
As in past years, most of the international family law cases in the United States involved
the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction4 and
its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.5 This
treaty has more ratifications and accessions than any other family law treaty concluded
under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
The Convention operates to return children to the state from where they were taken so
that state can determine issues of custody and visitation. To obtain a return order, the
petitioner must prove that: (1) the child was abducted from, or retained from returning
to, the country of the child's habitual residence; (2) the petitioner had "a right of custody"
under the law of the abducted-from State that is recognized under the Convention; and
(3) the petitioner was actually exercising those rights, or would have exercised those rights
but for the abduction. Jurisdiction is appropriate in either federal or state court.
1. Applicability of the Abudction Convention
The Hague Abduction Convention applies only to countries that have ratified it or
acceded to it. The Convention cannot be made applicable to a case by the stipulation of
the parties. The Convention ceases to apply when the child in question turns sixteen.
2. Habitual Residence
As in all Hague conventions, the Abduction Convention does not define the term "ha-
bitual residence." Therefore, courts have had to determine this "fact-based" issue in a
number of cases. The Fifth Circuit adopted the majority view among other circuits that
look to the parents' shared intent in determining their child's habitual residence. 6
A number of cases applied the "intent" standard this year. For example, a father's peti-
tion for the return of his infant son to France was dismissed when he failed to show that
3. Conclusions and Recommendations of the Sixth Meeting of the Special Commission, HAGUE COrNF. PRIVATE
INr'L L., http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid=5378&dtid=2 (last visited Feb. 7,
2013).
4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670 [hereinafter Hague Abduction Convention].
5. Pub. L. No. 100-300, 102 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11 (2006)).
6. Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 310-11 (5th Cir. 2012). The leading case is Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 1999).
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France was the American-born infant's habitual residence.7 In that case, the unmarried
parents lacked a mutual, settled intent that the mother and child would remain in France
after they returned there from the United States. The court, in dismissing the petition,
emphasized the couple's unstable and dysfunctional relationship. In another case, a Mexi-
can mother did not consent to her husband retaining their daughter in the United States
after the girl was smuggled across the Mexico/U.S. border, where their intent that the
child live in the United States was conditioned on the mother also being able to enter the
country (which she was unable to do).8 In another case, where the parties' last fixed intent
was to live in Maine, the United States was found to be the child's habitual residence, and
therefore, the father's retention of the child after a visit to the United States was not
wrongful.9 The court also noted that, although the child's immigration status can form a
part of the analysis concerning the parents' shared intent, it does not by itself determine
whether a child is a habitual resident.
Another court held that an agreement the parents of a non-marital child signed stating
that the child could live in Iceland constituted very strong evidence that the habitual resi-
dence of the child was Iceland.'o The same rationale justified holding that a notarized
affidavit signed by a child's parents while vacationing in Puerto Rico, in which the father
agreed that the child would remain there with the mother indefinitely after he returned to
Argentina, constituted evidence of the parents' last agreed-to intent as to where the child
should live, and therefore changed the child's habitual residence from Argentina to Puerto
Rico." Likewise, parents who had a "bi-continental marriage" and routinely traveled with
their child between the father's home in Italy and the mother's home in New York did not
have a shared intent that Italy would be the child's habitual residence because the parents'
separation agreement that was signed several years earlier provided that the mother would
have custody and live in New York.12
Not all circuits use the parental-intent test to determine habitual residence, however.
In the Sixth Circuit, the intent of the parents is not usually relevant to a determination of
habitual residence. Thus, the mother's intent in a case where the mother relocated to the
United States from Sweden following her divorce was held not to affect the determination
that the child's habitual residence was in Sweden.13
3. Rights of Custody
In Radu v. Toader, where neither the divorce decree nor the law of Romania explicitly
gave a petitioner-father a ne exeat right, he did not have a right of custody when the
divorce decree explicitly awarded custody to the respondent-mother.14 In some situations
it is often necessary to analyze the decision of a foreign tribunal completely to determine
exactly what effect the decisions have on a parent's right of custody. For example, in
7. Brosselin v. Harless, No. ClI-1853MJP, 2011 WL 6130419, at *6-9 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011).
8. Mota v. Castillo, 692 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2012).
9. See Thompson v. Gnirk, No. 12-CV-220-JL, 2012 WL 3598854, at *13-14 (D.N.H. Aug. 21, 2012).
10. Vela v. Ragnarsson, 2011 Ark. App. 566, 386 S.W.3d 72, 74-75.
11. Darin v. Olivero-Huffman, No. CIV. 12-1121 CVR, 2012 WL 3542514, at *13 (D.P.R. Aug. 16, 2012).
12. Guzzo v. Cristofano, No. 11 CIV. 7394 RJS, 2011 WL 6934108, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2011).
13. Jensie v. Jensie, No. CIV.A. 2012-203 WOB, 2012 WL 5178168, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2012).
14. Radu v. Toader, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10, 12-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd, 463 F. App'x 29 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Felder v. Wetzel,' 5 various orders of the Swiss Guardianship Authority and court were re-
sponses to the daughter's need for emergency psychiatric care in United States. The or-
ders did not strip the mother, a Swiss resident, of her right of custody under Swiss law
because the Swiss Authority's ex parte order restricting the mother from removing her
daughter from the hospital was merely a precautionary injunction. The Authority's subse-
quent decree revoked the injunction in recognition that the emergency measures taken by
the Massachusetts Family Court obviated the need for the Authority's prior precautionary
measures, and the appropriate Swiss court with jurisdiction issued an order stating that the
Authority's revocation of the mother's parental custody was obsolete.
A removal or retention is only wrongful if the left-behind parent with a right of custody
was actually exercising that right at the time of removal or would have exercised that right
but for the removal. A federal district court interpreted this requirement to mean short of
clear abandonment, a parent with valid custody rights under the law of the child's habitual
residence should be found to be exercising such rights.' 6
4. Wrongful retention
In Chafin v. Chafin, the father's taking of his child's passport so that the child and the
mother could not return to Scotland after a visit with the father intended to determine
whether reconciliation was possible constituted a wrongful retention of the child.17 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that the appeal was moot, however, because the child had
already returned to Scotland.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a con-
flict between the circuits concerning the mootness issue. 19
5. Defenses
a. Settled in New Environment
A respondent may assert several defenses to prevent the child from being returned.
One defense is contained in Article 12 of the Hague Abduction Convention. It provides
that the judicial authorities of the abducted-to country need not return the child if more
than one year has elapsed between the abduction, or retention, and the filing of the peti-
tion for return and if the child has settled in a new environment. 20 The one-year period of
Article 12 runs from the wrongful retention or removal. The Second Circuit in Lozano v.
Alvarez21 disagreed with other circuits, 22 holding that this provision of Article 12 was not
subject to equitable tolling. It noted that the one-year period is not a statute of limitations
15. 696 F.3d 92, 99-100 (1st Cir. 2012).
16. Fernandez v. Somaru, No. 2:12-CV-262-FTM-29, 2012 WL 3553779, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2012).
17. Chafin v. Chafin, 101 So. 3d 234, 236 (Ala. Civ. App.) (discussing Chafin v. Chafin, 37 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1600 (N.D. Ala. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 81 (2012).
18. Brief for Petitioner, Chafin v. Chafin, No. 11-1347 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2012), 2012 WL 4503268 at *13.
The Eleventh Circuit's order dated February 6, 2012 is unpublished but incorporated in the record on appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Joint Appendix, Chafin, No. 11-1347, 2012 WL 4481425, at app. 1.
19. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 81, 81 (2012). For the most recent case holding that the return of the child
does not render the case moot, see Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2012).
20. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 12.
21. 697 F.3d 41, 55 (2d Cir. 2012).
22. Id. at 56. See Dicetz v. Dietz, 349 F. App'x 930, 932-33 (5th Cir. 2009) (susmn. order); Duarte v.
Bardales, 526 F.3d 563, 569-70 (9th Cir. 2009); Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 723-24 (11th Cir. 2004).
VOL. 47
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 151
and that neither the text nor the background materials of the Convention supported equi-
table tolling. The State Department has also interpreted the Convention as not allowing
tolling. An intermediate appellate court in New Jersey came to the opposite conclusion,
but only where the acts of the abducting parent actually prevented the left-behind parent
from timely commencing an action. In F.H.U. v. A.C.U., the court found that bureau-
cratic delays and the petitioning mother's financial and travel difficulties were not suffi-
cient to equitably toll that one-year period for an action seeking return of the child from
the United States to her habitual residence in Turkey.23
In determining whether a child is well-settled, the Lozano opinion held that while immi-
gration status can be a factor in determining whether a child is well-settled, it cannot be a
determining factor. The court held that the following facts should be considered in deter-
mining whether a child is well-settled:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the stability of the child's residence in the new environment;
(3) whether the child attends school or daycare consistently;
(4) whether the child attends church [or participates in other community or extracur-
ricular school activities] regularly;
(5) the respondent's employment and financial stability;
(6) whether the child has friends and relatives in the new area; and
(7) the immigration status of the child and the respondent.
b. Preference of the Child
A second defense is provided in Article 13. The child need not be returned if the child
objects to being returned and has attained an age and maturity where it is appropriate to
take account of the child's views. 24 There were no cases discussing this defense this year.
c. Grave Risk of Harm
A third defense is contained in Article 13(b) and provides that a child need not be
returned if the child would be subjected to a great risk of psychological or physical harm if
returned. 25 The respondent is required to prove this defense by clear and convincing
evidence. 26 This, according to the Seventh Circuit, means that the trial court must make
findings of fact with regard to the risk of physical or psychological harm.27 Therefore, a
district court had to be reversed in an action brought by a Canadian father against an
American mother.
23. F.H.U. v. A.C.U., 48 A.3d 1130, 1145, 1147 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 2012).
24. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 4, art. 13.
25. Id. art. 13(b).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A) (2006).
27. Khan v. Fatima, 680 F.3d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2012).
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A grave risk defense was sustained in a case where the court found the Peruvian father
had committed acts of domestic violence in front of the child, had threatened to kill him-
self and the child, and the Peruvian police did not appear to take the matter seriously.28
But, in Nixon v. Nixon, the return to the Australian father of a child wrongfully retained
by the mother in the United States after the father returned to Australia following the
family's trip to New Mexico was held to not have posed a grave risk of harm to the child.29
In that case, there was no danger of the child's separation from the mother, who was
nursing the child, as the mother also planned to return to Australia, and the father did not
intend to seek sole custody. The father's leg cramping and obsessive-compulsive disorder
did not pose a danger to the child, and the mother's financial concerns did not indicate an
intolerable situation. Another case rejected the defense in a situation where the father was
a member of an Israeli community that condones polygamy and considers women sub-
servient to men because the trial court found that her return would not place her in an
intolerable situation.30
d. Other Attempted Defenses
A father's membership in an Israeli community that condones polygamy and considers
women subservient to men is also not a basis for denying his petition for his daughter's
return from the United States under Article 20 of the Hague Abduction Convention be-
cause the return of a child would not utterly shock the conscience of the court or offend
all notions of due process.3i
The equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" was held not to apply in a proceeding under
the Convention. 32 In another case, the mother's petition for return of her child should
not have been granted where her ex-husband had been awarded custody in their Texas
divorce action.33 The court said that the return order itself effected a "wrongful removal."
The panel also noted the mother gave clear and unequivocal consent for the Texas court
to make a final custody determination, noting that she never initiated custody proceedings
in the United Kingdom. "Quite simply, the only thing in the record suggesting that [she]
disagreed with the Texas court's authority is the filing of the instant action ... Although
the mother - like most parents - was devastated to lose primary custody of her child,
that fact cannot serve as evidence of non-consent."34
6. Other Issues Under the Hague Abduction Convention and ICARA
a. Attorney Fees
A prevailing petitioner in a return action is entitled to attorney fees, unless the recovery
is clearly inappropriate. 3s In Saldivar v. Rodela,36 the court, after an exhaustive discussion,
28. Acosta v. Acosta, No. CIV. 12-342 ADM/SER, 2012 WL 2178982, at *5-6, *9-10 (D. Minn. June 14,
2012).
29. Nixon v. Nixon, 862 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1180-82 (D.N.M. 2011).
30. Walker v. Kitt, No. 12 C 5937, -- F. Supp. 2d -, 2012 WL 5237262, at *8-9 (N.D. 111. Oct. 24,
2012).
31. Id. at 11.
32. Uzoh v. Uzoh, No. Il-CV-09124, 2012 WL 1565345, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2012).
33. Larbie v. Larbie, 690 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2012).
34. Id. at 310-11.
35. 43 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) (2006).
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determined that fees should be awarded even if the petitioner was represented by Legal
Aid. The court also determined that the defense of "unclean hands" did not apply to the
issue of whether attorney fees should be awarded and ultimately reduced the award by 55
percent given the father's "straightened" circumstances.
b. Access
A federal district court determined that not only would the mother have to return to
Turkey with the children at the end of the school year, but also that the court had jurisdic-
tion to enforce the visitation order issued by the Turkish court while the children were in
the United States.37
c. Procedural Issues
It is usually improper to stay a Hague return order pending appeal.38 A mother's appeal
from a federal district court order granting her ex-husband's petition for the return of
their children to the Czech Republic, based not on a finding of wrongful removal, but
instead on the parents' stipulation that the children be returned there for a custody hear-
ing, must be dismissed as moot.3 9
A California court held that it was improper for a trial court to condition the child's
return on the mother returning with the child because the mother could, by her unilateral
action, defeat the return order.40 It was also improper to condition the return on the
father obtaining a dismissal of the criminal charges brought against the mother in Italy
since obtaining the dismissal was beyond the father's control.
In an unusual case, the district court in Schleswig, Germany, ordered the father to
obtain a decision from a U.S. court by October 23 as to whether the "removal or retention
of the parties' minor daughter [by the mother] was wrongful" under the Hague Abduction
Convention.41 The U.S. district court, noting the "somewhat awkward position," did so
even though it noted that the mother had not been served and could vacate the court's
ruling within forty-five days of being served. 42
B. THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
According to the Texas Court of Appeals for San Antonio, the method of service set
forth in Article 19 of the Hague Service Convention, which states "to the extent the inter-
nal law of a contracting state permits methods of transmission of documents coming
abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provi-
sions," 43 applies only when the internal law of the contracting state specifically provides
36. Saldivar v. Rodeli, No. EP-12-CV-00076-DCG, -- F. Supp. 2d -, 2012 WL 4497507, at *6, *9,
*17 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2012).
37. In re S.E.O., 873 F. Supp. 2d 536, 545-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
38. Rowe v. Vargason, No. 11-1966, 2011 WL 6151523, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2011).
39. Leser v. Berridge, 668 F.3d 1202, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2011).
40. Maurizio R. v. L.C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93, 113-14, 116 (Cal Ct. App. 2011).
41. Hynes v. Berger, No. CIV. JFM-12-3000, 2012 WL 4889854, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 12, 2012).
42. Id.
43. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361.
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for the service of documents coming from abroad.44 Therefore, for a mother to establish
that service of process on the father, a Mexican resident, complied with Article 19 of the
Service Convention - so as to be effective as to the mother's petition to enforce a Mexi-
can child custody order - the mother was required to show that the service of process
method employed complied with the internal law of Mexico. Because the mother did not
prove that the father was served through Mexico's Central Authority, the father was not
properly served with process, and a default judgment entered against him was void.
In another case, a Minnesota district court erred when it relied on Minnesota law to
determine whether service was proper in Norway instead of determining the issue under
the Service Convention. 45
C. OTHER CASES INVOLVING INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAw LITIGATION
1. Marriage
A New Mexico court rejected an Australian judgment stating that a woman who had
lived with a man from 1981 until his death in 2007 was his "de facto spouse," holding that
the Australian judgment did not create a marriage recognizable under New Mexico law
such that the woman could be considered the man's surviving spouse because a "de facto"
relationship pursuant to the law of New South Wales in Australia is not equivalent to
marriage in Australia and because the relationship between the couple "was not equivalent
to a common law marriage" under New Mexico law.46 Louisiana recognized a marriage of
first cousins that was entered into in Iran in 1976.47
Texas determined that a woman was entitled to an annulment for fraud when she
showed that the man from Colombia married her only to obtain a green card, and when
he was able to live in the United States, he left her and took most of her assets.48 The
court rejected the husband's argument that she was only entitled to a divorce. The Colo-
rado Court of Appeals decided that, after declaring a couple's marriage invalid on the
ground that the wife had fraudulently induced the husband to marry her to gain entry into
the United States, a judge should not have proceeded to divide part of the husband's
retirement plan and award the wife spousal support.49 The court said that the wife should
not be rewarded for her fraudulent conduct. Also entitled to an annulment was a "hus-
band" whose "wife" had failed to obtain a legal divorce from her first husband in Pakistan
after he pronounced a talaq to her there, making the current relationship bigamous.50
2. Divorce - Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Divorce
An Alabama appellate court held that a trial court had jurisdiction to divorce a husband
and wife where the husband had been a resident of Alabama for six months even though
44. In re J.P.L., 359 S.W.3d 695, 707 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
45. Shults v. Shults, No. Al 1-935, 2012 WL 254496, at *2, *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2012).
46. Dion v. Rieser, 2012-NMCA-070, 285 P.3d 678, 682.
47. Ghasserni v. Ghassemi, 2011-1771 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/8/12); 103 So. 3d 401, 403, 405.
48. Montenegro v. Avila, 365 S.W.3d 822, 823-24 (rex. App. - El Paso 2012, no pet. h.).
49. In re Marriage ofJoel, No. 10CA1881, - P.3d -, 2012 WL 3127305, at *6-7 (Colo. App. Aug. 2,
2012).
50. Naseer v. Moghal, No. 0301-12-4, 2012 VVL 3288117, at *6 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2012).
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the wife was a resident in Scotland.51 In In re Marriage Ricard, an Illinois appellate court
held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies to all divorce cases and that
France, where the wife had filed for divorce, would be a more convenient forum for the
divorce of a French couple.52 Finally, an appellate court in Maryland held that it was not
an abuse of discretion for a trial court to stay its divorce proceeding in deference to a prior
filed divorce proceeding in Ghana.53
3. Children's Issues
a. Adoption
Russia signed a new agreement with the United States in 2012 concerning the adoption
of Russian children. The agreement "tightens the rules for Americans adopting children
from the Russian Federation. Specifically, a foreign family can adopt a Russian child only
if there is no Russian family found for the child. The deal also provides for more control
of the child following the adoption."54
b. Custody
i. Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Two courts addressed the relationship between the UCCJEA and the Hague Abduction
Convention. In one case, a Colorado court concluded that even though there was a de-
fense to the return of the child to Canada under the Abduction Convention, application of
the UCCJEA required that the Canadian court, as the home state of the child, make the
determination as to which parent should have custody.55 The court also determined that
it was proper for the Colorado court to exercise emergency jurisdiction until the Canadian
court ruled on custody.
In the other case, an English court determined that England was the child's habitual
residence, and, based on that determination, the mother moved to dismiss the father's
custody case in Texas on the ground that the jurisdiction issue had been determined in
England.56 The trial court's determination to dismiss the case was reversed on appeal
because all England could decide under the Hague Abduction Convention was the merits
of the abduction case, not the merits of the custody case, including the jurisdictional issue,
and that "home state" under the UCCJEA and "habitual residence" under the Abduction
Convention are not equivalent concepts.
A Georgia court determined that it had jurisdiction to terminate the rights of adoptive
parents of a child who came from Zambia to Georgia for extensive medical procedures
and had lived in Georgia for more than six months with persons acting as parents.57
A New Jersey appellate court held that, before dismissing a custody case because of a
pending proceeding in Pakistan, a New Jersey judge should have determined whether the
51. Chafin v. Chafin, 101 So. 3d 234, 236 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).
52. In re Marriage Ricard, 975 N.E.2d 1220, 1231 (1ll. App. Ct. 2012).
53. Apenyo v. Apenyo, 32 A.3d 511, 415 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).
54. Brandon Gatto, Putin Signs Russia-US Child Adoption Agreement, JURIST (Jan. 31, 2012, 9:09 AM),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/07/putin-signs-russia-us-child-adoption-agreement.php.
55. In re T.L.B., 272 P.3d 1148, 1155 (Colo. App. 2012).
56. In re A.S.C.H., 380 S.W.3d 346, 350 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2012, no pet. h.).
57. In re E.E.B.W., 733 S.E.2d 369, 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
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home state of the child was in New Jersey and whether the child's absence in Pakistan was
meant to be temporary.58 An Ohio court exercised jurisdiction over children based on
their significant connections to the forum and the presence of substantial evidence regard-
ing the children despite the fact that at the time the case was filed the father lived in
Sweden and the mother and the children in Ethiopia.59 It should be noted that the
mother and children were stranded in Ethiopia because the father had taken their
passports.60
On the other hand, a Maryland court did not have jurisdiction to decide the custody of
two children who had lived in Ghana with their father for more than six months, and even
if it might have technically had jurisdiction over one of the children, the doctrine of forum
non conveniens sustained the trial court's determination that custody of both children
should be decided together in Ghana. 61 A Maryland court also declined to exercise juris-
diction over an international child custody case where Maryland was not the home state of
the child at issue, who was living in Japan at the time of the case and had for her entire
life, and a Japanese court had not declined to exercise jurisdiction over the matter. 62 The
court also determined that Japanese custody law did not violate fundamental principles of
human rights.63
A Washington court determined that even though it had jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA, it should decline jurisdiction in favor of Poland because the child had resided
outside Washington for the majority of his life, had resided consistently in Poland since
January 2008, and all of the evidence concerning his circumstances and care was located in
Poland, as well as most of the witnesses."
It was error for a Texas court to enforce a Mexican custody determination without an
evidentiary hearing when the mother explicitly asked for such a hearing before the regis-
tration of the Mexican determination. 65 A Florida court determined that once a father
returned to Ecuador with his child as ordered by the district court, the mother's appeal
became moot. 66
ii. Relocation
A Californian court allowed a Thai mother to move to Thailand with her child but
conditioned the order on the mother posting a $10,000 bond and agreeing to the contin-
58. Sajjad v. Cheema, 51 A.3d 146, 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
59. Mulatu v. Girsha, 2011-Ohio-6226, No. CA2011-07-051, 2011 WL 6017968, T9 2-4, 34.
60. Id. $ 7.
61. Apenyo v. Apenyo, 32 A.3d 511, 519 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011).
62. Toland v. Futagi, 40 A.3d 1051, 1066 (Md. 2012).
63. Id. at 1065. See also In re Hickman, No. 01-12-00572-CV, 2012 WL 4858070, at *6 (Tex. App. -
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet. h.) (holding that Texas did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate custody of two
children who had lived for more than six months in Japan and that the father did not present sufficient
evidence for the trial court to determine whether Japanese custody law violated fundamental human rights
law). For other cases where a court determined that it did not have jurisdiction because the child's home state
was in another country, see Malik v. Fhara, 948 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (holding that New York
did not have jurisdiction to decide custody of a child whose home state was Bangladesh); Chaflin v. Chafin,
101 So. 3d 234, 236 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (holding that Alabama could not determine custody of a child
whose home state was Scotland even though it could grant the husband a divorce).
64. In re P.M.M, 168 Wash. App. 1022, 1026 (Wash. Ct. App. May 29. 2012).
65. Razo v. Vargas, 355 S.W.3d 866, 874 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet. h.).
66. Garces v. Legarda, 86 So. 3d 602, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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ued jurisdiction of the Californian court on all custody and visitation matters.67 Another
Connecticut trial court did not abuse its discretion when issuing an order allowing a di-
vorced custodial mother to travel with her children overseas without prior notice to their
father, even though he was worried that she would take them to her native Russia, whose
accession to the Abduction Convention has not been accepted by the United States.68
The Connecticut Court of Appeals held that it was not in the children's best interest to
prevent them from visiting their family there. Additionally, it found that the mother did
not pose a flight or abduction risk because she had established a home and career in Con-
necticut and was in the process of becoming a U.S. citizen.
In comparison, the Washington Supreme Court held that international travel restric-
tions were properly imposed on a divorcing father's visitation rights where his wife estab-
lished that he had threatened to abscond with their children to his native India.69 The
court noted that India is not a party to the Hague Abduction Convention, thus making it
difficult for the mother to retrieve the children if the father did take them there. The
court also approved the use of expert testimony on the likelihood of abduction and re-
jected the father's claim that this was no more than racial profiling.
iii. Substantive Custody Determinations
The Second Circuit held that an unenforceable Dominican Republic custody decree
cannot be used as the basis for deportation of a child who claims he was entitled to stay in
the United States because he was living with the father at the time the father became a
naturalized citizen.70
A Vermont trial court's order awarding the mother primary responsibility of the parties'
child, based on the trial court's independent research on the Internet after the close of
evidence, was held to be an abuse of discretion.71 The only matter in dispute with respect
to custody was the husband's wish to take the child to visit his home country of
Zimbabwe. The husband had asserted during the trial court hearing that there was exten-
sive information available on Zimbabwe. The trial court judge expressed concern about
the husband's belief that it was safe to take his daughter. The Vermont Supreme Court
held that the trial court's independent investigation of a "sampling" of articles on the
Internet was not amenable to review, as it was not possible to determine whether the
"sampling" of information was exhaustive or selective. Moreover, the husband was de-
prived of notice of the trial court's reliance on the articles in making the custody determi-
nation and the opportunity to be heard.
A Texas Court of Appeals held that a mother's relocation to Mexico without permission
of the court was sufficient to justify a modification of custody to the father because the
67. Di Napoli v. Di Napoli, No. B235354, 2012 WL 2878646, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 16, 2012).
68. Stancuna v. Stancuna, 41 A.3d 1156, 1159 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). See also Gagnon v. Glowacki, 815
N.W.2d 141 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (allowing mother to move from Michigan to Canada); M.P. v. M.P., 54
A.3d 950 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (trial court abused its discretion in not allowing a mother with sole custody to
take the child to Ecuador for a three-week visit). For a case where the trial court appointed the father the
primary custodian of the child due to, in part, a risk of abduction by the Taiwanese mother, see Chen v.
Hernandez, No. 03-l 1-00222-CV, 2012 WL 3793294 (Tex. App. - Austin 2012, pet. denied).
69. Katare v. Katare, 283 P.3d 546, 551 (Wash. 2012).
70. Garcia v. USICE, 669 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2011).
71. Rutanhira v. Rutanhira, 2011 VT 113, 1f 8-11, 190 Vt. 449, 35 A.3d 143, 146.
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mother took the child to Mexico without telling the father beforehand, the child was
abruptly removed from school in the middle of the term, the mother and her husband had
not secured jobs or a home in Mexico at the time they left with the child, and the mother
failed to return the child to the father for his visitation and Christmas visitation as pro-
vided in the divorce decree.72
c. Parentage and Child Support
A Californian appellate court determined that it could exercise jurisdiction over a
Jordanian father for alimony and child support because he had continued to manage rental
real property in California and he continued to hold a pension account/investment in
California.73 In addition the appellate court found that it could not ignore the fact that
the property was an important part of the proceedings for "purposes of ascertaining the
parties' financial condition and needs (concerning issues of child support, spousal support
or attorney fees) and for purposes of a final division of the marital property."74
Another case exercising jurisdiction over a foreign national for child support was Oytan
v. David-Oytan.7s A Turkish husband and his wife were "living in a marital relationship"
within Washington state such that jurisdiction over the husband, pursuant to Washing-
ton's long-arm statute, was proper. The court listed a number of factors, including that
the husband helped his wife obtain a job in the state, moved his family to Washington
from Los Angeles, established a family home in the state, owned personal property in the
state, actively sought business opportunities in the state, placed his daughter in school in
the state and was active in her school activities, received medical care in-the state, regis-
tered his car and had insurance in the state, held himself out as living in the state, and
returned to the state whenever he was not working. The court therefore found that the
couple was "living in a marital relationship within the state" and thus that jurisdiction over
the husband was proper.
Notwithstanding a mother's self-serving statement that she intended "on returning to
live in Kansas when able to do so," a Kansas appellate court held that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding that the mother of an out-of-wedlock child was a Kansas
resident, as required to provide the trial court with exclusive jurisdiction to modify the
child support order under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act.76 The mother's
home in Hong Kong was the center of all aspects of her life. The mother married a Hong
Kong resident who was a chief executive officer of a Hong Kong corporation in which the
mother claimed a 50 percent interest and which employed her full-time. The child also
attended school in Hong Kong.
A German father's attempt to deviate from Louisiana's child support guidelines due to
higher taxes in Germany was denied because the evidence showed that the father got
married in Germany, paid for a lavish wedding, purchased a house, and traveled to the
United States on occasions during which he did not attempt to visit the child.77
72. Arredondo v. Betancourt, 383 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
73. In re Marriage of Abureyaleh, No. F063399, 2012 WL 4484914, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2012).
74. Id.
75. Oytan v. David-Oytan, 288 P.3d 57, 69 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012).
76. State ex rel. SRS v. Ketzel, 275 P.3d 923, 927 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012).
77. Estapa v. Lorenz, 11-852 (LaApp. 5 Cir. 3/27/12); 91 So.3d 1103, 1106-07.
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A Michigan court held that even if Quebec was not a reciprocating state under the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, its support order was entitled to be recognized
under notions of comity.7 8 The Virginia Court of Appeals held that a trial court had the
authority to enforce a Cameroon father's duty to support his children by entering a quali-
fied domestic relations order permitting a mother to attach a retirement account belong-
ing to the father for the sole purpose of paying the father's child support arrearage of over
$28,000.79
A Minnesota court held an illegal alien in contempt for failure to pay child support and
for violating the purge condition by not looking for work.80 In rejecting the alien father's
argument that the purge condition was invalid because federal immigration laws barred
employers from hiring him, the court pointed out that such laws did not preclude him
from looking for work unless he uses false or fraudulent documents.
d. Juvenile Cases
A California court determined that the Guatemalan Protocol is not a treaty and that
federal laws pertaining to children who are the victims of human sexual trafficking do not
preempt state dependency law.8' Instead, the court held that concurrent jurisdiction ex-
isted, thus triggering similar, but not identical, statutory provisions governing the juvenile
court's consideration of whether to terminate state dependency court jurisdiction. Al-
though both systems protect children and seek to facilitate family reunification or repatri-
ation, the court reasoned that the focus of each system differs and that the respective
systems are not entirely commensurate. In contrast to the child-centered focus of the
California dependency system, "the purpose of the [TVPA and Wilberforce Act] is to
combat human trafficking, ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and protect
their victims." 82 The Californian court held that the child was both a dependent of the
California juvenile court and a victim of human sexual trafficking, and thus, was entitled to
protections afforded by both systems. The court further rejected the juvenile court's find-
ings that the Guatemalan Protocol was a treaty, explaining:
The Guatemalan Protocol was developed jointly by the Guatemalan Ministry of Ex-
terior Public Relations and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United
Nations agency responsible for delineating and overseeing international labor stan-
dards, to assist Guatemalan efforts to meet minimum standards for the elimination of
human trafficking in compliance with the U.N. Protocol. The Guatemalan Protocol
outlines the steps its various government agencies are to take on behalf of
Guatemalans who are victims of human trafficking abroad or Guatemalan or foreign
individuals who are victims of trafficking in Guatemala.83
A Pennsylvania court held that a Spanish-speaking father's language barrier and lack of
appointed counsel made it impossible for him to understand and act upon his parental
78. Gaudreau v. Kelly, - N.W.2d -, No. 304345, 2012 WL 4897994, at*1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16,
2012).
79. Nkopchieu v. Minlend, 718 S.E.2d 470, 477 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
80. Zaldivar v. Rodriguez, 819 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
81. In re Y.M., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2006)).
82. Id. at 70 (quoting § 7101(a)).
83. Id. at 65.
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rights and responsibilities as to his adjudicated dependent children in a proceeding to
terminate such rights because all of the spoken and written communications with him
about the case were in English.84
A California appellate court applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to dismiss the
appeal of a mother who absconded to Mexico while a dependency proceeding was pend-
ing.85 The mother appeared to use her residency in Mexico as a means to avoid direct
supervision by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and full compli-
ance with her case plan. The mother had no contact with DCFS or the juvenile court for
over two years, and even after DCFS located her and the children, she was completely
unavailable by telephone, instead limiting her direct communication with DCFS to
monthly letters or e-mails. Disentitlement did not require proof that the mother was in
violation of the orders that were the subjects of her appeals.
4. Other Cases
a. Affidavit of Support
There were several cases discussing the federal support affidavit required to sponsor an
immigrant to the United States. In Winters v. Winters,86 the court determined that there
was no federal jurisdiction to enforce the affidavit. This creates a split of authority on the
issue.87
In Love v. Love,88 a Pennsylvania appellate court determined that the trial court erred in
determining that the wife's ability to enforce the support award was limited to a civil suit
instead of seeking alimony. The court also decided that it was error to impute income to
the wife to determine whether her income was 125 percent of the federal poverty level and
that a deviation from the Pennsylvania alimony guidelines was proper to enforce the affi-
davit. The Seventh Circuit determined that the person seeking support does not need to
attempt to find work in order to minimize damages.89
A Texas trial court erroneously limited the liability of the husband under a divorce de-
cree to thirty-six months.90 The divorce decree was reformed to indicate that the monthly
amount continued until the conditions of federal law are met. But, in comparison, an
Ohio court held that a man's obligation to his immigrant wife under a federal Affidavit of
Support ceased when her "qualifying quarters" of employment combined with his to total
the forty quarters required by federal law to terminate his support duty as her sponsor.91
b. Property
A Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a wife's interest in a Russian apartment that she
and her parents received when the Russian government privatized the apartment was ap-
propriately characterized as a gift from the government to the wife and her parents, and
84. In re P.S.S.C., 32 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
85. In re E.M., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
86. No. 6:12--cv-536-ORL-37DAB, 2012 WL 1946074, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 30, 2012).
87. See Montgomery v. Montgomery, 764 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331 (D.N.H. 2011).
88. 33 k3d 1268, 1274 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
89. Liu v. Mund, 686 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2012).
90. In re Marriage of Kamali, 356 SW.3d 544, 547 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
91. Davis v. David, 2012-Ohio-2088, 970 N.E.2d 1151, 1158.
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therefore, was the wife's separate property.92 Similarly, a Texas appellate court held that a
trial court had not impermissibly modified a divorce decree by ordering the parties to sell
their property in India because the order only carries out the parties' divorce decree.93
c. Criminal Law
A U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia interpreted the International Paren-
tal Kidnapping Crime Act94 to criminalize a parent taking a child out of the United States
with the intent to obstruct the other parent's lawful exercise of physical custody or visita-
tion rights.95 Accordingly the court found that it was proper to charge the defendant for
retaining his daughter in Iran for two years even though he and the child's mother had
equal custody rights to the child.
92. Avdeyeva v. Barabanov, No. All-160, 2011 WL 6141618, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2011).
93. Vats v. Vats, No. 01-12-00255-CV, 2012 WL 2108672, at *4 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] June 7,
2012, pet. denied).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (2006).
95. United States v. Homaune, - F. Supp. 2d -, No. 12-150 (JEB), 2012 WL 4858987, at *7 (D.D.C.
Oct. 15, 2012).
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